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Abstract
An epidemic that spreads in a network calls for a decision on the part of the network users.
They have to decide whether to protect themselves or not. Their decision depends on the
trade-o between the perceived infection and the protection cost. Aiming to help users reach
an informed decision, security advisories provide periodic information about the infection level
in the network.
We study the best-response dynamic in a network whose users repeatedly activate or de-
activate security, depending on what they learn about the infection level. Our main result is
the counterintuitive fact that the equilibrium level of infection increases as the users' learning
rate increases. The same is true when the users follow smooth best-response dynamics, or any
other continuous response function that implies higher probability of protection when learning
a higher level of infection. In both cases, we characterize the stability and the domains of
attraction of the equilibrium points. Our nding also holds when the epidemic propagation is
simulated on human contact traces, both when all users are of the same best-response behavior
type and when they are of two distinct behavior types.
1 Introduction
A computer worm is a program that self-propagates across a network, exploiting security or policy
aws in widely-used services [1]. Worms have the potential to infect a large number of computers,
due to the high level of interconnection of the telecommunication infrastructure. Indeed, a rela-
tively recent outbreak (Concker/Downadup worm) infected more than 9 million computers [2].
Countermeasures to an infection can be centrally enforced, or the decision for their adoption can
be left to individual agents such as individual home computer users or companies.
Centralized enforcing is more likely to work in tightly controlled environments, such as within
a company network where the users are obliged to abide by the company security policy. In the
wireless network setting, controlling the infection has been studied [3] under the assumption that
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the network operator is able and willing to control the communication range of each device. Optimal
control policies are found, which strike a balance between slowing the spread of the infection and
increasing the end-to-end trac delay in the network.
However, when it is up to individual agents to invest in protection against infection [4{7],
contradicting incentives appear. Although agents want to be safe against viruses, they would prefer
to avoid paying the cost of security. Security may not only cost money, it may also reduce the
utility of the network, for example by isolating the agent from the rest of the network. Moreover,
it may reduce the utility of the device, for example by slowing it down [8].
The risk-seeking attitude of humans when faced with potential losses [9] might shed some light
on user incentives. In psychological experiments, Tversky and Kahneman [10] observe that their
subjects prefer risking a large loss (in our case, becoming infected) if they also have the chance
of losing nothing, rather than taking a sure but smaller loss (in our case, activating security).
Therefore, if the threat is not absolutely certain nor imminent, users will resist spending any
resources on security (\One solution [for selling security] is to stoke fear." [9]).
To complicate things further, user incentives may change with time, as the information available
to them changes. There exist security advisories that provide information about current and newly
emerging threats in popular technology products [11,12]. Such information inuences user decisions
and incentives by changing their perception of the risks involved. On the one hand, if users receive
news of an ongoing epidemic, they are much more willing to protect themselves. On the other
hand, when the infection has subsided and there is no clear danger, complacency may set in with
a consequent reduction in the time and resources spent to ensure safety.
To the best of our knowledge, only static incentives of agents have been studied [4, 5]. Users
have only been modeled as deciding once-and-for-all whether to install or not a security product.
The once-and-for-all approach applies to installing a patch, but other countermeasures exist that
can be later revoked by the user: doing background scanning with an antivirus software, setting up
trac-blocking lters on rewalls, disconnecting networks or computers, etc.
In this paper, we study myopic decision-makers who receive dynamically-updated information
about the level of infection in the network. We model agents as more likely to activate countermea-
sures when the infection level is high and, when the infection level is low, as less likely to activate
them, or more likely to de-activate them. We combine the epidemic propagation of the worm with
a game theoretic description of the user behavior into a nonlinear dynamical system. Similarly to
other papers on security investments [4, 5], we do not collect observations to estimate the precise
shape of real-user response functions. In this sense, clearly, our conclusions are of a qualitative
nature. If practitioners wish to derive quantitative results from our model, in Section 2.4.7 we
provide guidance on how to nd approximate estimates of the parameter values.
Our main scenario comprises the following three elements: (i) a homogeneous mixing network
(random pairwise contacts), (ii) homogeneous and best-response (discontinuous) user behavior, with
a single threshold that determines whether they activate or deactivate their protection, and (iii)
users learn what the infection level is at a rate called the learning rate. We also test alternative
scenarios for user behavior (smooth best-response; two user classes instead of homogeneous user
behavior) and for network mixing (simulations on human mobility traces).
Our contributions are as follows:
 The network reaches an endemic equilibrium1, that is, an equilibrium where the infection per-
sists. Our main conclusion is the following counterintuitive result: the higher the learning
1The equilibrium notion that we use is in the long-term sense, i.e. as t!1.
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Table 1: Table of Important Notations
 rate of disinfection (average infection duration is 1 )
 contact rate of network users
 rate of informing users about the infection level
I infection threshold, in the best-response model, above which users switch
to protected
rate, the higher the infection level at the equilibrium.
 We conrm our main conclusion in three cases: (i) in our main scenario (Section 3), (ii) in a
scenario with smooth best-response user behavior (Section 4.1), and (iii) in a scenario with
best-response behavior, with either one or two classes of users simulated on real mobility
traces (human pairwise contacts) (Section 4.2).
 In the best-response and smooth best-response user behavior scenarios, we identify the equi-
librium points (Sections 3.3 and 4.1.1), we show under which conditions they are locally stable
(Sections 3.4 and 4.1.2), we rule out the possibility of closed trajectories and we characterize
the domains of attraction for each equilibrium point (Sections 3.5 and 4.1.3).
2 The SIPS Model for Epidemic Propagation and User Be-
havior
2.1 Epidemic Propagation
There are N users in the network. Each user can be in one of three states:
 Susceptible, denoted by S. The user does not have any countermeasures in place and is not
infected.
 Infected, denoted by I. The user is infected by the virus and will spread it to any susceptible
user he makes contact with.
 Protected, denoted by P . The user has countermeasures in place. As long as the user is in
this state, he is immune to the virus.
The number and fraction of users in each state are denoted, respectively, by NS ; NI ; NP and
S; I; P . It follows that NS + NI + NP = N and S + I + P = 1. The state of the network is
x = (S; I; P ), and the set of possible states is X = 1NN
3 3 fNSN ; NIN ; NPN g.
The evolution of the network state x is described as a Continuous Time Markov Process, as
follows. A Poisson process of rate ++ is associated with each user. At an epoch of the Poisson
process of user i { say at time t { one of three events happens:
 With probability ++ , user i has a meeting with another user, chosen uniformly at random.
If the meeting is between a susceptible and an infected user, the susceptible user becomes
infected. Otherwise nothing happens.
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Table 2: Events that can happen in the network, their results, and how each event changes the
network state x = (S; I; P ).
Event : Meeting between an S user and an I user
Result : S user becomes infected
Change : 1N ( 1;+1; 0)
Event : Update received by S user
Result : S user becomes protected with probability pSP (x)
Change : 1N ( pSP (x); 0;+pSP (x))
Event : Update received by P user
Result : P user becomes susceptible with probability pPS(x)
Change : 1N (+pPS(x); 0; pPS(x))
Event : Disinfection of I user
Result : I user becomes protected
Change : 1N (0; 1;+1)
 With probability ++ , user i receives an update about the network state x, and he has the
opportunity to revise his current strategy if his state is S or P . If i's state is S, he switches
to P with probability pSP (x). If i's state is P , he switches to S with probability pPS(x). If i
is infected, nothing happens.
 With probability ++ , user i has a disinfection opportunity. That is, if i is infected, he
becomes disinfected, and we assume he becomes protected. If i is not infected, nothing
happens.
Table 2 summarizes the possible events and how each event changes the network state.
2.2 User Behavior - Best-Response Dynamics
As can be seen from the epidemic propagation model, the only point at which the users can make
a choice is at an update event. There is a cost cI associated with becoming infected, and a cost
cP associated with becoming protected. It holds that cI > cP > 0, because if cI < cP there is no
incentive for a susceptible user to become protected. There is no cost for being susceptible. Note
that these costs need not be the actual costs; user decisions are inuenced by the costs as perceived
by the users.
The choice between susceptible and protected depends on which state minimizes the user's
expected cost. The cost of protection is always cP . If the user chooses to remain susceptible when
the network state is x = (S; I; P ), the user's expected cost is IcI , as (i) the cost of infection is cI ,
(ii) there is a fraction I of infected users, and (iii) the homogeneous mixing assumption implies
that the meeting between any given pair of users is equiprobable to any other pair. That is, the
probability that the next meeting of the user is with an infected user is equal to I. See also the last
paragraph of this section, the discussion in 2.4, and in particular 2.4.6 and 2.4.4.
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Therefore, the user's decision would be S if IcI < cP , and P if IcI > cP . If IcI = cP , then
both choices are optimal, and any randomization between them is also optimal. So, when IcI = cP ,
the functions pSP (x) and pPS(x) are multivalued. Note that the user's decision depends only on
the value of I, rather than the whole state x of the network, so we will slightly abuse the notation
and use pSP (I) and pPS(I) in what follows. We denote by I
 the value of I that equalizes the
(perceived expected) cost of infection with the cost of protection:
I , cP
cI
:
The two functions become
pSP (I) =
8><>:
0; I < I
[0; 1]; I = I
1; I > I
pPS(I) =
8><>:
1; I < I
[0; 1]; I = I
0; I > I
:
Note that it is possible to generalize the users' perceived expected cost of infection at infection
level I. Instead of IcI , the perceived expected cost can be any increasing function cI(I) of the
infection level I. The only dierence in this case is that I is such that cI(I) = cP . The rest of
the analysis proceeds with no change.
2.3 Putting Everything Together
We consider the large population scenario, i.e., the limit as N ! 1. Gast and Gaujal [13] show
that, when N ! 1, the trajectory of the stochastic system converges in probability to a solution
of a dierential inclusion. If the solution is unique, the stochastic system converges to it. If there
are multiple solutions for the same initial conditions, then the stochastic system can converge to
any of them.
In our case, the Continuous Time Markov Process described previously converges to a solution
of the following system of dierential inclusions (for brevity, the dependence of S; I; P on t is not
explicitly shown):
d
dt
S 2  SI   SpSP (x) + PpPS(x)
d
dt
I = SI   I
d
dt
P 2 I + SpSP (x)  PpPS(x)
Since S+ I +P = 1, we can eliminate one of the three state variables. We eliminate P , and the
system becomes
d
dt
S 2  SI   SpSP (x) + (1  S   I)pPS(x) (1a)
d
dt
I = SI   I; (1b)
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together with P = 1   S   I. The state space D := f(S; I)j0  S  1; 0  I  1; S + I  1g is
bounded. This system2 is two-dimensional and autonomous3.
We denote the right-hand side of system (1) by F (x), and we slightly abuse the notation for x
to be x = (S; I); x 2 D. So, system (1) becomes
d
dt
x 2 F (x):
2.4 Discussion of Model Assumptions
2.4.1 Worm lifecycle S ! I ! P
The S ! I ! P is a normal lifecycle of a worm. Susceptible users become infected when compro-
mised by the worm. Infected users stop being infected after some time; they then become protected
as a result of the action that they take to ght the infection.
Many other potential lifecycles are conceivable [1]. S ! I ! S is another model that has
been considered [15]. It applies, for instance, when the users reboot their machines to delete the
worm. Not all worms are deleted in this way (e.g. they might be in the Master Boot Record of the
computer, and so they might reload themselves upon reboot). But if the worm is deleted, then the
machine simply re-enters the susceptible state upon reboot. The SEIR model [14] can be used for
modeling worms with a dormant phase (E for Exposed) before becoming actively infectious.
2.4.2 Adoption/removal of countermeasures and their timing
In our model, the countermeasures that users can activate or deactivate include the following:
 Using antivirus software or special programs to clean infected computers.
 Setting up rewall lters to block the virus or worm trac.
 Disconnecting networks or computers when no eective methods are available.
Other countermeasures exist. A popular one, which has received a lot of attention in the research
community [16], is to patch or to upgrade susceptible devices in order to make them immune to
the virus or worm. Of course, note that, if all devices are eventually patched, then there can be no
long-term infection.
Adoption and removal of measures is a binary (on/o) choice in our case; users can choose
between being either completely susceptible or completely protected. The antivirus software is either
active or not; the rewall lter either exists and blocks the worm packets or not. An alternative
would be to model a gradual adoption of a security measure. For instance, we could introduce a
parameter for the scanning rate of a rewall and allow for the gradual increase of this rate. This
would gradually increase the cost of protection and gradually decrease the probability of infection.
We only allow users to adopt/remove the countermeasure at the update epochs. In principle,
users are free to do both at any time they want. But in between update epochs, they do not have
any new information. So, we assume that, if they want to act, they will act immediately when they
receive the latest update.
2Note that for  = 0 the model is identical to the standard SIR epidemic model (R stands for Recovered). For
pSP (x) = 0; 8x, and pPS(x) = 1;8x, it is identical to the SIRS model [14]. Therefore, our SIPS model generalizes
both SIR and SIRS.
3An autonomous system is a system of ordinary dierential equations whose parameters do not explicitly depend
on the independent variable (time t in our case).
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2.4.3 Homogeneous Mixing and Network Topology
Our homogeneous mixing assumption is suitable for worms that perform random uniform scans of
the IP address space to nd new victims (Code Red (version 2) [17], Slammer [18]). It does not apply
to worms whose propagation is topology dependent [19], e.g. by emails to the address-book contacts
of the infected user, or mobile phone worms that propagate by proximity (Bluetooth worms).
In Section 4.2, we perform simulations on human contact traces, to study dierent propagation
dynamics. We nd that our main conclusion persists.
2.4.4 Best-Response Dynamics and User Rationality
The concept of best-response is a fundamental one in game theory, and it is also one of the most
popular dynamics in evolutionary game theory. Hence, it is our main scenario in this paper. Best-
response dynamics lead to dierential inclusions, which unfortunately increases the complexity of
the analysis [20{23].
Dierential inclusions appear because of the multiplicity of optimal responses. In our paper the
multiplicity appears when I = I. At that value of I both protection and no protection are optimal,
as well as all randomizations among them. It turns out that under certain conditions (Eq. (3)), the
equilibrium point of the system is exactly on the line I = I; secondly, on a more technical note,
the system trajectories that pass from the point S =  ; I = I
 cannot be uniquely continued. So,
if we want to study best-response dynamics, we cannot aord to ignore dierential inclusions, as
the properties of the system under study are intricately aected.
Of course, users might not be perfectly rational. Even in the case of best-response dynamics,
we consider the users to be myopic: they do not take into account the long-term eects of their
actions, but they rather behave greedily. But the lack of user rationality may go even further. Their
perception of the cost may not be clear cut (e.g., they are not sure about the exact values of cI
and cP ). Alternatively, they may take the network state report to be not completely accurate. To
account for such cases, we study smooth best-response dynamics (Section 4.1). Briey, we assume
that pSP () and pPS() can be arbitrary functions of I, as long as pSP () is non-decreasing with I
and pPS() is non-increasing with I.
2.4.5 Uniform User Behavior
In the model as described, all users behave in the same way. To account for users with dierent
response functions, in Section 4.2 we simulate two user classes, each with a dierent best-response
function. An extension to more than two classes is straightforward.
2.4.6 Costs of Infection and Protection
The cost of infection and protection have been assumed to be constant, but this needs not be so.
For example, it is reasonable to make the infection cost depend on . A larger  means a shorter
infection duration, so the infection cost should presumably decrease with . The inuence of the
contact rate  is less clear. A higher  increases the probability of getting infected within the next
dt time units: this probability is Idt. On the one hand, the objective cost of infection itself does
not change (removing the virus from the computer, lost hours of productivity, lost/compromised
data, psychological eect on user, etc). On the other hand, as we already said, what matters is the
cost as perceived by the users. Perhaps a user feels more threatened due to the high contact rate .
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A further issue is the immediacy of the protection cost versus the vagueness of the infection cost.
The infection cost is a potential cost that will be paid in the future, if the user becomes infected.
The protection cost is an immediate loss. Humans heavily discount future losses and rewards.
We argue that none of the above considerations change our conclusions, unless some cost depends
on the update rate . Making the infection cost (and even the protection cost) a function of  and
 merely turns I into I(; ); as  and  are constants, I(; ) also remains constant with respect
to time, so our conclusions do not change. If, for some reason, I depends on , and it also happens
that the equilibrium infection is equal to I (which happens in the case of the equilibrium point X2,
Section 3), then our conclusions on the dependency of the equilibrium infection level on  would
be dierent.
The qualitatively dierent nature of the infection and protection costs (future versus immediate)
can be incorporated in our model by appropriately discounting the value of cI . The discounting
can even depend on , as  inuences the immediacy of the infection.
2.4.7 Parameter Identication
There are ve parameters in our model, ; ; ; cI ; cP , and two smooth best-response behavior
functions, pPS() and pSP (). Our main conclusion is qualitative, so it is not inuenced by the exact
values of these parameters. Any incidental quantitative results of our work, such as the infection
level at the equilibrium, are indeed sensitive to the parameter values. Even though it is not directly
relevant to our main contributions, we provide some insight on how an interested reader might go
about measuring these parameters.
To measure , we have to estimate the contact rate per infected user for a real worm, that is,
the number of infection attempts that the worm initiates each time unit. This can be done by
observing the behavior of the worm in the wild, or in a controlled environment, or by analyzing the
source code of the worm if it is available. All three methods are used by security researchers.
To measure , we have to estimate the time that a device remains infected. The duration of the
infection may be due to any number of factors, such as the user not noticing the worm, the user
being indierent, or the worm being inherently dicult to clean because its removal might cause
data loss, for example. Measurements for the infection duration can typically be collected by system
administrators, or any other person who is called upon to clean the infected device. Although it
is easy to establish the end time of the infection at a device, nding the start time might require
computer forensics techniques.
The value of  is likely easier to determine, because  is the update rate and updates are sent
to all the users in the network.
An approximate estimate for the infection and protection costs can be obtained, for instance,
through psychological/sociological tests and interviews, as well as purely technical and economic
evaluations. It is sucient for our best-response model that there be a threshold I for I, above
which the users switch from S to P and below which they switch from P to S. Similar considerations
apply for the derivation of the smooth best-response functions pSP (I) and pPS(I). Our conclusions
depend only on pSP (I) increasing with I and on pPS(I) decreasing with I. We believe that is a
very mild assumption on user behavior, but practitioners who wish to use our conclusions should
verify it.
The non-necessity of exact estimation of the various parameters/functions adds to the impor-
tance of our results, as a practitioner does not need to estimate the exact values of these parameters
in order to ascertain whether our conclusions apply. All that is necessary is that our qualitative as-
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sumptions be valid (e.g. assumptions on worm state evolution S ! I ! P , ability of users/devices
to activate and deactivate protection).
3 Results for Best-Response Dynamics
In this section, we study the behavior of dierential inclusion (1) for various values of parameters
; ;  and I. The main nding is that the equilibrium value of the infection increases with , but
it cannot increase above I. The technical results are summarized as follows (see also Fig. 1).
 Solutions exist.
 All solutions can be uniquely continued, except those that start at (S; I) =


 ; I


. These
latter solutions all start at the same point and then diverge, but none of them can ever
approach that point again. So, if we ignore the initial point of those solutions, all solutions
can be uniquely continued.
 Point X0 = (1; 0) is always an equilibrium point. If  < , one more equilibrium point exists:
X1 if I
 >
1  
1+ 
, or X2 otherwise

X1 =


 ;
1  
1+ 

and X2 =


 ; I


.
 If   , X0 is asymptotically stable4. If  < , X0 is a saddle point. If X1 exists, it is
asymptotically stable. Finally, if X2 exists, it is asymptotically stable.
 There are no solutions that are closed trajectories. All system trajectories converge to one of
the equilibrium points. When there is more than one equilibrium point (X0 and one of X1
or X2), a trajectory converges to X0 = (1; 0) if and only if it starts on line I = 0; all other
trajectories converge to the other point.
3.1 Existence of Solutions
We show that the dierential inclusion
d
dt
x 2 F (x); x 2 D (2)
has solutions.
We dene a partition of the state space D into three domains: D  = D \ f(S; I); I < Ig,
D+ = D \ f(S; I); I > Ig, and L = D \ f(S; I) : I = Ig. Domain L will also be referred to as the
discontinuity line.
A solution for this dierential inclusion is an absolutely continuous vector function x(t) dened
on an interval J for which ddtx(t) 2 F (x(t)) almost everywhere on J [24].
Theorem 1. Solutions of (2) exist.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4A point x0 is asymptotically stable, if for every  > 0 there exists a  such that if jjx(0)   x0jj <  then
jjx(t)  x0jj <  for every t  0, and also limt!1 x(t) = x0
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3.2 Uniqueness of Solutions
In general, because the right-hand side of (2) is multivalued, even though two solutions at time t0
are both at the point x0, they may not coincide on an interval t0  t  t1 for any t1 > t0. If any
two solutions that coincide at t0 also coincide until some t1 > t0, then we say that right uniqueness
holds at (t0; x0). Left uniqueness at (t0; x0) is dened similarly (with t1 < t0), and (right and left)
uniqueness in a domain holds if it holds at each point of the domain.
Theorem 2. All solutions of (2) can be uniquely continued, except possibly those that start at
(S; I) = (  ; I
). The latter ones will stay at that point if 0 2 F (  ; I), i.e., if (  ; I) is an
equilibrium point; otherwise, they can be continued in multiple ways.
Proof. See Appendix B.
3.3 Equilibrium Points
The equilibrium points are found by solving the inclusion 0 2 F (x) for x. If   , point X0 = (1; 0)
is the only equilibrium point. If  < , one more equilibrium point exists: X1 if I
 >
1  
1+ 
, or X2
otherwise

X1 =


 ;
1  
1+ 

and X2 =


 ; I


.
3.3.1 Equilibrium points above the discontinuity line
There can be no equilibrium points in the domain D+. The system becomes
d
dt
S =  SI   S
d
dt
I = SI   I:
From the rst equation, S has to be zero. But then the second equation implies that I also has
to be zero, which is not an admissible value for I as I = 0 cannot be above the discontinuity line.
3.3.2 Equilibrium points below the discontinuity line
There is either one or two equilibrium points in the domain D . The system becomes
d
dt
S =  SI + (1  S   I)
d
dt
I = SI   I:
This system has the solutions
X0 = (S0; I0) = (1; 0)
X1 = (S1; I1) =
 


;
1  
1 + 
!
:
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IS
X0
I = I∗
0
1
1
(a) The case   . The only equilibrium point is
X0 = (1; 0). It is stable and all trajectories con-
verge to it.  = 3:0;  = 4:0;  = 1:2; I = 0:3
I
S
X0
X1
S =
δ
β
I =
1−
δ
β
1+
δ
γ
I = I∗
0
1
1
(b) The case  <  and I >
1  

1+ 

. The point
X1 =



;
1  

1+ 


is a stable equilibrium point.  =
3:0;  = 1:0;  = 1:2; I = 0:8
I = I∗
S =
δ
β
(c) Detail of 1b around point



; I

. The con-
tinuation of a trajectory starting at



; I

is not
unique. Three sample trajectories are plotted, cor-
responding to dierent elements of set F ( 

; I).
I
S
X0
X2
S =
δ
β
I =
1−
δ
β
1+
δ
γ
I = I
∗
0
1
1
(d) The case  <  and I  1 


1+ 

. The point
X2 =



; I

is a stable equilibrium point.  =
3:0;  = 1:0;  = 1:2; I = 0:2
Figure 1: The vector eld of the system and the equilibrium points for all regions of the parameter
space. At each point (S; I), an arrow parallel to (dSdt ;
dI
dt ) is plotted. In gures 1b and 1d, point
X0 = (1; 0) is also an equilibrium point but it is unstable. All trajectories converge to X1 or X2,
respectively, except those that start on the axis I = 0, which converge to X0. The indicative
parameter values used are  = 3:0;  = 4:0; 1:0; 1:0;  = 1:2; I = 0:3; 0:8; 0:2.
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The second solution, X1, is admissible if and only if X1 2 D , i.e.,


 1;
1  
1 + 
< I; and


+
1  
1 + 
 1:
The third condition is always satised. Note also that if  = 1, then X0 and X1 coincide.
3.3.3 Equilibrium points on the discontinuity line
There is at most one equilibrium point on the discontinuity line I = I. To nd it we solve the
inclusion 0 2 F (S; I) for S. The system becomes
d
dt
S 2  SI + [ S; (1  S   I)]
d
dt
I = SI   I:
Since I > 0, ddtI is zero only when S =

 . We then have to check if it is possible to make
d
dtS
equal to zero, that is, if 0 2 F (  ; I). We nd that it is possible when I is such that
I 
1  
1 + 
: (3)
In that case, the equilibrium point is
X2 = (S2; I2) =



; I

:
The conditions for admissibility are S2 =

  1 and S2 + I2 =  + I  1. The latter is true if (3)
holds.
In general, there are many combinations of pSP (I
) and pPS(I) that make ddtS equal to zero,
but there is always one with pSP (I
) = 0. In that case, pPS(I) = I

(1   I)
.
3.4 Local Asymptotic Stability
3.4.1 Stability of X0 and X1
Theorem 3. X0 is asymptotically stable if and only if   ; X1 is asymptotically stable whenever
it exists ( > ) and the trajectories spiral towards X1 (at least locally). If  = , X0 and X1
coincide, and the resulting point is asymptotically stable.
Proof. We evaluate the Jacobian of the system at X0 and X1. See Appendix C.
3.4.2 Stability of X2
Theorem 4. X2 is asymptotically stable whenever it exists.
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Proof. To show that the equilibrium point on the discontinuity line is asymptotically stable, we will
use Theorem 5 below [24, x19, Theorem 3]. To use this theorem we transform the system so that
the line of discontinuity is the horizontal axis, the equilibrium point is (0; 0), and the trajectories
have a clockwise direction for increasing t.
We set x =    S and y = I   I. Domains D;D ; D+ become G = f(x; y)jx   ; y 
 I; y x  1  I   g, G  = G\f(x; y)jy < 0g, and G+ = G\f(x; y)jy > 0g. Then, the system
can be written as
dx
dt
= P (x; y) =  xy   (I + )x+ ( + )y   (1  I) + (I + 

)
dy
dt
= Q (x; y) =  x(y + I)
for (x; y) 2 G , and
dx
dt
= P+(x; y) =  xy   (I + )x+ y + (I + 

)
dy
dt
= Q+(x; y) =  x(y + I)
for (x; y) 2 G+.
The partial derivatives of P, that is, of P+ and of P , are denoted by Px ; P

xx; P

y etc., and
similarly for Q. We dene two quantities A in terms of functions P, Q and their derivatives
at (0; 0):
A ,

Px +Q

y
P
  Q

xx
2Qx

:
Theorem 5. Let the conditions
Q  = Q+ = 0; P  < 0; P+ > 0
Q x < 0; Q
+
x < 0
be fullled at (0; 0). Then, A+   A  < 0 implies that the zero solution is asymptotically stable,
whereas A+  A  > 0 implies that the zero solution is unstable.
All the conditions of Theorem 5 are satised in our case, together with A+   A  < 0. The
condition P  < 0 is equivalent to (3), i.e., the condition on I that causes the equilibrium point to
be on the line of discontinuity. All the other conditions are straightforward to verify. For example,
to prove that A+ A  < 0 we can quickly establish that A+ < 0 and A  > 0, again using (3).
3.5 Domains of Attraction
Consider an autonomous system on the plane, as ours is. If a half trajectory T+ of such a system is
bounded, then its !-limit set5 
(T+) contains either an equilibrium point or a closed trajectory [24,
x13, Theorem 6].
The main result for our system is
5The !-limit set of a half trajectory T+(x = (t); t0  t < 1) is the set of all points q for which there exists a
sequence t1; t2; : : : tending to 1 such that (ti)! q as i!1.
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Theorem 6. For any half trajectory T+, its !-limit set 
(T ) can only contain equilibrium points,
that is, X0 = (1; 0), X1 = (S1; I1) =


 ;
1  
1+ 

, or X2 = (

 ; I
).
Proof. If  > , then only X0 exists. There are no closed trajectories as
d
dtI < 0, so all trajectories
converge to X0. For the remainder of the proof, we assume   , so either X1 or X2 exists and is
stable.
The following two functions are useful6:
E(S; I) , S   S1 ln(S) + I + 

ln(I); (S; I) 2 D+
M(S; I) , S   (S1 + 

) ln(S +


) + I   I1 ln(I); (S; I) 2 D :
It holds that E(S; I) is constant on trajectories in the area D+, and M(S; I) is decreasing along
trajectories in the area D . Indeed, with some calculations it can be shown that
d
dt
E(S; I) =
@E
@S
dS
dt
+
@E
@I
dI
dt
= 0
d
dt
M(S; I) =
@M
@S
dS
dt
+
@M
@I
dI
dt
=   (S   )
2
S + 
1 + 
1 + 
 0:
Under the assumption   , we prove
Lemma 1. A trajectory converges to X0 = (1; 0) if and only if it starts on line I = 0.
Proof. See Appendix E.
From now on, we limit our attention to trajectories that have no common points with the line
I = 0.
Assume that there exists a half trajectory T+ whose limit set 
(T ) contains a closed trajectory
 . By successively eliminating properties of  , we prove that   cannot exist.
Lemma 2. Point (  ; I
) cannot be on a closed trajectory.
Proof. See Appendix F.
As (S; I) = (  ; I
) cannot be on  , there holds right uniqueness on  . Hence, 
( ) =  .
We now prove that   cannot have more than two or fewer than two intersection points with L.
Lemma 3. A closed trajectory   that does not pass through the point (  ; I
) cannot have either
more than two or fewer than two intersection points with the discontinuity line L. If it has two
intersection points, they cannot be on the same side of (  ; I
).
Proof. See Appendix G.
Lemma 4. A closed trajectory   cannot intersect the discontinuity line L on exactly two points
that are on opposite sides of (  ; I
).
6Functions of this form are Lyapunov functions for the SIRS epidemic model [26]. Although they are not Lyapunov
functions in our case, we found them using the technique described in [26]: looking for functions of the form
f1(S) + f2(I) whose time-derivatives do not change sign.
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Proof. See Appendix H.
From the previous lemmata, we conclude that there can be no closed trajectory  . Therefore,
all trajectories have to converge to equilibrium points.
3.6 Discussion of Results
Fig. 2 shows that the total fraction
1  
1+ 
of infected at the system equilibrium increases with the
update rate , until
1  
1+ 
becomes equal to the threshold I. This increase is due to the combination
of two factors. First, when
1  
1+ 
< I, the trajectories will eventually be completely contained in
domain D  (below I). In this domain, at each time a protected is informed about the fraction
of infected, he will choose to become susceptible, thus fueling the infection. Second, no susceptible
will choose to become protected. The larger the value of , the shorter time a user will spend being
protected, thus the smaller the fraction of protected. However, a smaller fraction of protected
implies a larger fraction of infected, as the fraction of susceptible at equilibrium is necessarily  ,
i.e., it is independent of .
I
γ
I∗
X1 : I(γ) =
1−
δ
β
1+
δ
γ
X2 : I(γ) = I
∗
Figure 2: The total fraction of infected as a function of .
When
1  
1+ 
> I, the equilibrium fraction of infected is limited to I: further increases of  have
no eect. The explanation is that, as soon as the instantaneous value of I exceeds I, susceptible
users switch to protected, and protected users stay protected, thus bringing the infection level
below I, into the domain D . However, there is no equilibrium point for the system in D , so the
only possible equilibrium value of I is I. For I = I there are in general many combinations of
pSP (I
) and pPS(I) that lead to an equilibrium, including one with pSP (I) = 0 and pPS(I) > 0.
That combination means that no susceptible users become protected, but some protected become
susceptible. Other combinations with both pSP (I
) > 0 and pPS(I) > 0 would be harder to justify,
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as they imply that at the same value of I users would switch from susceptible to protected and
back.
4 Robustness of Results with Respect to Model Assump-
tions
In our main scenario (Section 2), all users follow best-response (multivalued and discontinuous)
dynamics, they contact each other uniformly at random, and they all have the same behavior
function.
In the current section we show that our conclusions do not change if we vary these assumptions.
In all cases we show that the equilibrium infection level increases with the update rate . In
particular, we prove that this holds even if users follow any arbitrary continuous and single-valued
response function, as long as pSP (I) increases with I and pPS(I) decreases with I; we call this the
smooth best-response case. We also show that there are no periodic solutions, so all trajectories
converge to equilibrium points. Further, we perform simulations on human contact traces, as
opposed to assuming uniform contact patterns. We conrm again that the equilibrium infection
increases with the update rate, whether the users have a common behavior function or they are
split into two types (each with a dierent best-response threshold).
The more technical results in the smooth best-response case (equilibrium points, conditions for
asymptotic stability, absence of closed trajectories) parallel the ones in the best-response case.
4.1 Smooth Best-Response
The user behavior functions pSP (I) and pPS(I) are continuously dierentiable, and we require that
d
dI pSP (I) > 0 and
d
dI pPS(I) < 0. Other than that, the two functions are arbitrary. The stochastic
system converges to a system of ordinary dierential equations [27,28].
As mentioned above, it is still the case that the equilibrium infection level increases with the
update rate . Further technical results follow:
 Two equilibrium points may exist, X0 and X1. X0 exists always, X1 when   pPS(0)pSP (0)+pPS(0)
(Condition (5)).
 X0 is asymptotically stable when X1 does not exist. X1 is asymptotically stable whenever it
exists.
 The trajectories of (4) must converge either to X0 or to X1. When (5) does not hold, all
trajectories converge to X0. When (5) holds, trajectories starting at points with I = 0
approach X0 along line I = 0, whereas all other trajectories converge to X1.
4.1.1 Equilibrium Points
The equilibrium points of the system are found by solving the equation F (x) = 0 for x:
0 =
d
dt
S =  SI   SpSP (I) + (1  S   I)pPS(I) (4a)
0 =
d
dt
I = SI   I (4b)
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From (4b), either I = 0 or S =  .
 Equilibrium point X0
Substituting I = 0 into (4a), we nd X0 = (S0; I0) =

pPS(0)
pSP (0)+pPS(0)
; 0

. These values of
(S0; I0) are always admissible as they are always non-negative and at most equal to 1.
Recalling the meaning of pPS(0) and pSP (0), we can reasonably expect that pPS(0) = 1 and
pSP (0) = 0. Protected users have no reason to remain protected, and susceptible users have
no reason to become protected, when there is no infection in the network. In this case, X0 is
(1; 0).
 Equilibrium point X1
Substituting S =  into (4a), it follows that I has to satisfy g(I) = 0, where
g(I) ,  I   

pSP (I) + 

1  

  I

pPS(I):
To solve g(I) = 0 for I we need to know the two response functions pSP (I) and pPS(I).
But even without knowing them, we can still prove that g(I) = 0 has a unique solution for
I 2 [0; 1   ] under the condition


 pPS(0)
pSP (0) + pPS(0)
: (5)
The proof proceeds in three straightforward steps; we omit the details. The rst step is to
show that dg(I)dI < 0, so g(I) strictly and monotonically decreases in the interval [0; 1   ]. The
second step is to show that g(0)  0, which leads to (5), and then to show that g(1   ) < 0.
The nal step is to use the Intermediate Value Theorem to conclude that there is exactly one
solution of g(I) = 0 in [0; 1   ].
Denoting by I1 the solution of g(I) = 0, we conclude that X1 = (S1; I1) = (

 ; I1) is uniquely
determined under (5). The values S1; I1 are admissible as they are both between 0 and 1,
and their sum is at most equal to 1. Note that if (5) does not hold then both g(0) < 0
and g(1    ) < 0, so the monotonicity of g in [0; 1    ] implies that X1 does not exist.
Consequently, (5) is both necessary and sucient for the existence of X1.
4.1.2 Asymptotic Stability
Theorem 7. X0 is asymptotically stable when X1 does not exist. X1 is asymptotically stable
whenever it exists.
Proof. We evaluate the Jacobian of the system at X0 and X1. See Appendix D.
4.1.3 Domains of Attraction
Theorem 8. The trajectories of (4) must converge either to X0 or to X1. When (5) does not
hold, all trajectories converge to X0. When (5) holds, trajectories starting on line I = 0 approach
X0 along I = 0, whereas all other trajectories converge to X1.
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Proof. Since the system is two-dimensional and F is continuously dierentiable, we can use Dulac's
criterion [29] to show that the system can have no periodic trajectory.
Theorem 9 (Dulac's criterion). Let A be a simply connected domain. If there exists a continuously
dierentiable function h : A ! R such that r  (hF ) is continuous and non-zero on A, then no
periodic trajectory can lie entirely in A.
In our case, domain A is the state space excluding line I = 0. Note that there can be no periodic
trajectory that passes from a point with I = 0. We select as function h the function h(S; I) = 1I .
We compute r  (hF ) to be
r  (hF ) =      pSP (I)
I
   pPS(I)
I
< 0; 8(S; I) 2 A;
which is continuous and non-zero in A. Then, from Dulac's criterion, no periodic trajectory lies
entirely in A, and, consequently, the system has no periodic trajectory at all. From the Poincare-
Bendixson theorem, the system can only converge to a periodic trajectory or an equilibrium point;
so, we can conclude that every trajectory must converge to an equilibrium point, that is, either to
X0 or to X1.
More precisely, when (5) does not hold, only X0 exists so all trajectories converge to X0. When
(5) holds, both X0 and X1 exist, and X0 is a saddle point. Trajectories starting on line I = 0
approach X0 along I = 0, whereas all other trajectories converge to X1. Indeed, if I(0) > 0, then
the corresponding trajectory will have I(t) > 0;8t > 0. The reason is that if I(t0) = 0 for some nite
t0 > 0, then the uniqueness of solutions would be violated at (S(t0); I(t0)), because (S(t0); I(t0))
would be a common point with the trajectories that approach X0 along the line I = 0. If t0 =1,
i.e., the trajectory with I(0) > 0 converges asymptotically to X0 while I(t) remains strictly positive,
then we reach a contradiction as ddtI will become positive at points close enough to X0 (see (5) and
(4b)).
4.1.4 The equilibrium infection increases with 
The no-infection equilibrium point X0 = (1; 0) is unaected by . We show now that, at X1 =

 ; I1

, the equilibrium level of the infected increases with .
Theorem 10. The infection I1 at X1 =


 ; I1

increases with .
Proof. The derivative dI1d is always positive:
I1 satises g(I1) = 0, i.e.,
 I1   

pSP (I1) + (1  

  I1)pPS(I1) = 0 (6)
Dierentiating (6) with respect to  we have
dI1
d
G(I1) = H(I1);
where
G(I1) ,     

dpSP (I1)
dI1
  pPS(I1) + (1  

  I1)dpPS(I1)
dI1
;
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and
H(I1) ,


pSP (I1)  (1  

  I1)pPS(I1):
But G(I1) < 0 and H(I1) < 0 for all values of I1. Therefore,
dI1
d is positive.
The negativity of G(I1) is deduced from
dpSP (I1)
dI1
> 0 and dpPS(I1)dI1 < 0. The negativity of H(I1)
is deduced from (6):  pSP (I1)  (1     I1)pPS(I1) =    I1 < 0.
Dividing (6) by  and taking the limit  !1, the limiting value of I1 is the solution to


pSP (I1) = (1  

  I1)pPS(I1):
This limiting value is admissible, as it is also a solution of g(I) = 0, hence it lies in the interval
[0; 1   ].
4.2 Propagation on Human Contact Traces
In this section, we use human contact traces to simulate the propagation, instead of assuming
uniform contact patterns; the objective is to test the robustness of our conclusions with respect to
the contact pattern. Moreover, instead of only having a common response function for all users,
we now include the case where users are split into two classes, each with a dierent best-response
behavior function. Note that we choose to have two classes to keep the presentation simple, but we
believe that our results carry over to multiple user classes. Using enough user classes, it is possible
to approximate any arbitrary continuous distribution of user behaviors.
The traces used are Bluetooth contacts among 41 devices given to participants in a conference
[30]. These traces were collected over a period of approximately 72 hours.
For the single user class case, a piecewise-continuous response function is used (Fig. 3):
pSP (I) =
8><>:
0 I < I   2
1
 (I   I + 2 ) I   2 < I < I + 2
1 I > I + 2
and pPS(I) = 1  pSP (I).
For the two user-class case, we use separate piecewise-continuous response functions for each
class. Users in the rst class have a low threshold I1 = 0:1. Because of their low threshold, these
users become protected easily, and they do not easily switch from protected to susceptible. We
call them responsible because the way they behave helps reduce the infection. The second class of
users, who we call selsh, have a high threshold I2 = 0:9. This means that they hardly ever decide
to switch from susceptible to protected, whereas they almost always decide to leave the protected
state. For both classes  = 0:001.
We now establish that the fraction of infected indeed increases for larger values of the update
rate . For the simulations that follow, we set7  = (6hr) 1, and we plot the system trajectories
on the S  I plane (average of 30 simulations) for three dierent values of , (1hr) 1, (6hr) 1, and
(24hr) 1. The initial conditions for all simulations were 1 infected and 40 susceptible. In the case
of two user classes, the initially infected user is of class 2 (selsh). Each simulation runs until either
there are no infected, or the end of the traces is reached.
7These are indicative values. Our purpose is not to model any specic worm, but to show that our conclusions
(dependence of the infection level on ) hold for worms with a range of characteristics.
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Figure 3: The user response function pSP (I) used in the simulations: the probability that a sus-
ceptible user switches to being protected, upon learning the fraction I of infected users in the
network.
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Figure 4: Single user behavior class. The trajectory of the system (average of 30 simulations) on the
SI plane, when  = (6hr) 1 and  takes the values (1hr) 1, (6hr) 1, and (24hr) 1. The thresholds
are I = 0:1; 0:5; 0:9. The network experiences higher numbers of infected devices for higher values
of . I limits the infection when I = 0:1; 0:5.
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In Fig. 4 we plot simulation results for the single user class case for I = 0:1; 0:5; 0:9, and
 = 0:001, omitting an initial transient phase. The system state oscillates between two equilibrium
points, X0 (nighttime, when the contact rate is low) and either X1 or X2, depending on whether I

is low enough to limit the infection or not. In all cases, the system trajectories go through higher
values of I for increasing values of , thus conrming our main conclusion that the infection level
increases with the update rate. The eect of lowering I is that it limits the maximum infection at
the equilibrium, so the trajectories are capped at values of I not far above I.
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Figure 5: The trajectory of the system (average of 30 simulations) on the SI plane, when  = (6hr) 1
and  takes the values (1hr) 1, (6hr) 1, and (24hr) 1. Users are split into two classes: the
responsible, with I = 0:1, and the selsh, with I = 0:9. The columns correspond to the total
population, the responsible subpopulation, and the selsh subpopulation. The rows correspond to
a total population split of 20%-80%, 50%-50%, and 80%-20% into responsible and selsh. As in the
case of a single user class, the network experiences higher numbers of infected devices for higher
values of . In the current case of multiple user classes, the higher number of infected is mostly
due to the selsh users.
In Fig. 5 we plot the system trajectories for the two user-class case. We again omit the initial
transient phase, and we show the susceptible and infected of 1) the total population (rst column),
2) the responsible subpopulation (second column), and 3) the selsh subpopulation (third column).
Each row corresponds to a dierent split of the total population into responsible and selsh subpop-
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ulations. In the rst row, the responsible-selsh split is 20%-80%, in the second row it is 50%-50%,
and in the third row it is 80%-20%.
We again conrm the conclusion that the fraction of infected in the total population increases
for larger values of . Two secondary conclusions relate to the situation within each subpopulation:
the selsh user trajectories seem as if the selsh were isolated. That is, their trajectories are very
similar to those they would follow if they were alone in the network (compare with the case I = 0:9
in Fig. 4). The responsible users, on the contrary, stay mostly in the bottom left region, which
means that many of them stay protected. Comparing with the case I = 0:9 in Fig. 4, they now
stay a bit closer to the bottom left corner. This means that the selsh-caused infection keeps more
of them protected than if they were alone in the network. The observations on the selsh and on
the responsible are mutually compatible, as the users that are protected (here, the responsible)
do not interact with the rest of the network, so the trajectories of the remaining users (here, the
selsh) seem as if they were isolated.
5 Policy implications and potential solutions
We have conrmed our main conclusion across various scenarios: the higher the learning rate,
the higher the infection level at the equilibrium. In order to avoid such an increased infection
level, various potential solutions suggest themselves. Firstly, because increasing  increases the
infection, it makes sense to reduce , that is, to stop informing users about the current infection
level. However, this solution seems a bit radical, throwing out the baby with the bath water. A
more moderate solution would be to inform users only if the infection level exceeds I. As long as
the infection level is below I, the users would not be informed at all, or they would be informed
only about the existence (but not the level) of the infection. This solution would indeed decrease
the infection, assuming that the users do not start interpreting the absence of information as an
indirect notication that the infection level is low.
Another solution is to decrease I, as I limits the maximum infection level. Decreasing I
(I , cPcI ) means decreasing cP or increasing cI . On the one hand, increasing cI (or user perception
of cI) could be achieved by holding users liable
8 if their devices become infected, or by increasing
user awareness for the consequences of an infection. Decreasing cP , on the other hand, could be
done by moving the cost of protection to the mobile operator (or ISP). The operator would have
an incentive to shoulder the cost (at least part of it), if it is liable8 in case of user infection.
Increasing user awareness could also help change the behavior of users. In particular, users
should be informed about the long-term consequences of staying unprotected. This might change
their myopic behavior.
A synthetic solution that would guarantee a zero-infection level at the equilibrium, is the fol-
lowing: Activate security at the rst sign of infection (equivalent to I = 0) and keep it activated
until the infection drops back to zero. That is, the only updates would be at the beginning and at
the end of the infection, rather than at a constant rate. However, that would require modifying the
behavior of the users, as not all users can be expected to behave voluntarily in such a responsible
manner (as I = 0 implies they would).
8Penalizing users or software publishers has already been proposed, in the law community, as a potential reform
for regulating worms in cyberspace [31].
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have studied the interaction of two factors, myopic decision-makers and dynamic information
updates, in the context of security activation decisions in a network with a propagating worm. Our
main scenario is the best-response user dynamic in a homogeneous mixing network. We conclude
that an increased update rate counterintuitively leads to an increased equilibrium infection level.
Our conclusion does not change when the users follow smooth best-response dynamics (arbitrary
continuous single-valued function). Our conclusion remains valid in the case of best-response be-
havior, with one or two classes of users (low and high threshold) simulated on real mobility traces.
In the best-response and smooth best-response dynamics, we identify the equilibrium points,
show when they are locally stable, and rule out the possibility of closed trajectories. We also
characterize the domains of attraction for each equilibrium point.
In future work, we aim to study the transient behavior of the system. The transient behavior
becomes important when the convergence to equilibrium is slow: the time average of the infection
cost over some initial nite interval might be quite dierent from the equilibrium cost.
It may also be worth examining alternative worm models, and testing whether our main conclu-
sion holds for them, too. For example, the SEIR model is more suitable for a worm with a dormant
phase after infecting a user but before starting to infect others. Alternative countermeasures, such
as patching, require dierent models, such as adding a new state R for the (patched) users that
have permanently recovered from the infection.
Worms have multiple spreading patterns (called \target discovery methods" [1]). Depending on
the pattern, the epidemic propagation can be faster or slower; it can even be topology dependent
(worms that spread to the local network of an infected user, or worms that spread to a user's email
contacts, for example). Our conclusions might then need to be modied.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Solutions of (2) exist.
Proof. A solution of (2) exists if, for every x 2 D, the basic conditions [24] apply: set F (x)
is nonempty, bounded, closed, convex, and function F is upper semi-continuous. A set-valued
function f(x) is called upper semi-continuous at the point x if (f(x0); f(x)) ! 0 as x0 ! x.
Function (A;B) is one characterization of the distance between two nonempty closed sets A and
B:
(A;B) = sup
a2A
inf
b2B
d(a; b); (7)
where d(; ) is the Euclidean distance between two points.
The basic conditions apply for (2). For every x =2 L, set F (x) is a singleton, hence, it is
nonempty, bounded, closed, and convex; additionally, function F is continuous at x, hence, it is
also upper semi-continuous.
At each point x 2 L, F (x) is the segment
F (S; I) =
 SI + [ S; 1  S   I]
SI   I

; (8)
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which is the smallest convex closed set containing all the limit values of F (x0) for x0 ! x 2 L.
When x0 ! x from D+, the limit value of F (x) is SI   S
SI   I

;
and when x0 ! x from D , the limit value of F (x) is SI + (1  S   I)
SI   I

:
Set F (S; I) is bounded and upper semi-continuous [24, x6, Lemma 3].
B Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. All solutions of (2) can be uniquely continued, except possibly those that start at
(S; I) = (  ; I
). The latter ones will stay at that point if 0 2 F (  ; I), i.e., if (  ; I) is an
equilibrium point; otherwise, they can be continued in multiple ways.
Proof. The solution is unique in D  and in D+ because F has continuous partial derivatives there.
A solution x(t) of (2) may intersect with the line of discontinuity L, say at time t = t0. We
now study when such a solution can be uniquely continued for t > t0, i.e., we study when right-
uniqueness holds.
Formally, let F (x) and F+(x) be the limiting values of F at a point x 2 L as F approaches
x from D  and from D+, respectively. Let h(x) = F+(x)   F (x), and F N , F+N , hN be the
projections of the vectors F , F+, h onto n = (0; 1), the normal to L directed from D  to D+ at
x.
The values of these vectors and projections are
F (x) = ( SI + (1  S   I); SI   I)
F+(x) = ( SI   S; SI   I)
h(x) = ( S   (1  S   I); 0)
F N = SI
   I
F+N = SI
   I
hN = 0:
On L, at the points where F N > 0, F
+
N > 0 (or F
 
N < 0, F
+
N < 0), the solutions pass from D
 
into D+ (correspondingly, from D+ into D ) and uniqueness is not violated [24, x10, Corollary 1].
So, at no point of L is uniqueness violated, except possibly at (  ; I
).
For a solution that starts at (  ; I
) there are two possibilities. First, if 0 2 F (  ; I), i.e., if
(  ; I
) is an equilibrium point, then the solution will stay at (  ; I
). But if 0 =2 F (  ; I), the
continuation is not unique: There is one continuation for each element of set F (  ; I
), and all of
them are tangent to L because ddtI = 0 when S =

 (see Fig. 1c). In the proof of Lemma 2, we
show that none of them can ever approach (  ; I
) again in the positive direction of time.
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C Proof of Theorem 3: local asymptotic stability of X0 and
X1 in the best-response case
We evaluate the Jacobian of the system
J(S; I) =
 I     S   
I S   

at X0
J(X0) = J(0; 1) =
      
0    

:
The eigenvalues of J(X0) are   and    . So, X0 is stable if and only if  < , in which case
note that X1 does not exist.
We evaluate the Jacobian at X1:
J(X1) = J
 


;
1  
1 + 
!
=
0@  +1+      
 
1+ 
0
1A
The eigenvalues of J(X1) are
a11
p
a211+4a12a21
2 , where aij are the elements of J(X1). Since
a11 < 0, the smallest eigenvalue is always negative. The largest one is negative if and only if
a12a21 < 0,  > . So X1 is stable whenever it exists.
The argument of
p
a211 + 4a12a21 takes a negative value at the point  = (1 +

 )
2   2 . As
the eigenvalues are a continuous function of , they will have an imaginary part for  close to
(1 +  )
2   2 , which means that the trajectories spiral towards X1.
D Proof of Theorem 7: local asymptotic stability of X0 and
X1 in the smooth best-response case
We show asymptotic stability by computing the Jacobian of the system (4) and evaluate it at these
two points.
J(S; I) =

j11 j12
j21 j22

where
j11 =  I   (pSP (I) + pPS(I))
j12 =  S   S d
dI
pSP (I)  pPS(I) + (1  S   I) d
dI
pSP (I)
j21 =I
j22 =S   
Both j11 and j12 are negative for all S and I, as
dpSP (I)
dI > 0 and
dpSP (I)
dI < 0.
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The Jacobian at X1 is
J(X0) =
 
 (pSP (0) + pPS(0)) J(X0)12
0  pPS(0)pSP (0)+pPS(0)   
!
:
The value of J(X0)12 is irrelevant for the calculation of the eigenvalues. The two eigenvalues of
J(X0) are the two diagonal entries:
01 =  (pSP (0) + pPS(0))
02 =
pPS(0)
pSP (0) + pPS(0)
  
The rst eigenvalue, 01, is always negative except in the trivial case where pSP (0) = pPS(0) = 0.
The second one is negative if and only if


>
pPS(0)
pSP (0) + pPS(0)
; (9)
which is exactly the opposite of condition (5). So, X0 is stable when X1 does not exist.
The Jacobian at X1 is
J(X1) =

J(X1)11 J(X1)12
I1 0

: (10)
The eigenvalues have the following form:
11; 
1
2 =
1
2

J(X1)11 
q
J(X1)211 + 4I1J(X1)12

(11)
They are both negative, since J(X1)11 and J(X1)12 are negative as mentioned before. So, X1
is stable whenever it exists.
E Proof of Lemma 1, part of Theorem 6
Lemma 1. A trajectory converges to X0 = (1; 0) if and only if it starts on line I = 0.
Proof. If the trajectory starts on line I = 0, then ddtI = 0, so I stays equal to 0, and the trajectory
stays on the line. And ddtS is positive everywhere on I = 0 except on X0, so the trajectory converges
to X0.
If the trajectory starts at a point (S0; I0); I0 > 0, then let M(S0; I0) = M0. For any S it holds
that limI!0M(S; I) =1. So, if the trajectory comes close enough to line I = 0, function M(S; I)
will have to increase above M0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, the trajectory cannot converge
to X0 = (1; 0).
F Proof of Lemma 2, part of Theorem 6
Lemma 2. Point (  ; I
) cannot be on a closed trajectory  .
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Proof. Assume (S; I) = (  ; I
) is on   (say, at time t1). We will reach a contradiction.
First of all, 0 =2 F (  ; I): if 0 2 F (  ; I) then (  ; I) would be an equilibrium point, so it could
not be part of a closed trajectory. Since 0 =2 F (  ; I), X2 is not an equilibrium point; then X1 is
necessarily an equilibrium point and it is distinct from (  ; I
) (see Fig. 1b).
We will now reach a contradiction by proving that   cannot approach (S; I) = (  ; I
) again for
any t > t1, thus   cannot be a closed trajectory.
Immediately after t1 (i.e., at point (

 ; I
)), trajectory   has to exit line L. Otherwise, right
uniqueness would be violated on the common points of L and  , as there are trajectories coming
from D+ into D  that pass from these points. So, Theorem 2 would be violated. Dene a region
  D  around (  ; I) that includes all points where function M takes values at least equal to
M(  ; I
)  , for some small enough  > 0 such that  does not include X1. As M is continuous
and X1 is distinct from (

 ; I
),  is well dened.
 , being a closed trajectory, has to encircle an equilibrium point [24, x13, Thm. 7]. So, it
would have to exit  and go around X1. But then, as M decreases along trajectories in D
 ,  
cannot reenter  before exiting D
 . But   can only exit D  by crossing line L, and M(  ; I
) 
M(S; I); 8(S; I) 2 L. So,   cannot cross L, because M would have to increase as   goes from
(  ; I
) to its next common point with L.
G Proof of Lemma 3, part of Theorem 6
Lemma 3. A closed trajectory   that does not pass through the point (  ; I
) cannot have either
more than two or fewer than two intersection points with the discontinuity line L. If it has two
intersection points, they cannot be on the same side of (  ; I
).
Proof. Denote by  \L = fl1; l2; l3; : : :g the common points of   with L, and denote by t1; t2; t3; : : :
the corresponding times.
 \L cannot be empty.   cannot be completely contained within the area D , because function
M is decreasing in D . Moreover,   cannot be completely contained within the area D+, because
  has to encircle an equilibrium point, but there is no equilibrium point in D+.
  \ L cannot be a singleton set. Assume it is, and call its element l1. Then,   has to be in D 
(except for l1) because it has to encircle X1. So   has to exit L immediately, otherwise it would
have more than one common points with L. If   exits an -neighborhood of l1, then, using function
M(S; I) we can show that   cannot return in an appropriate -neighborhood of l1, so   cannot be
closed.
  \ L cannot contain 3 or more distinct points. If there are 3 or more such points, at least two
of them have to be on the same side of (  ; I
). Call them li and lj , and their corresponding times ti
and tj . Without loss of generality assume they are to the right of (

 ; I
) on line L and that li is the
one closer to (  ; I
). Since li is distinct from (  ; I
), there is at least one more point on L between
(  ; I
) and li. Call that point , and consider the line segment LS from  to (1   I; I). By
construction, both li and lj are on LS. Segment LS is a transversal : it is intersected by trajectories
only in one direction, as ddtI > 0 for S >

 . Also, right uniqueness holds on the points of LS.
By Lemma 3, x13, in [24], the 
(T ) of a trajectory T can intersect transversal LS at not more
than one point. So, since   = 
( ), set   \ LS cannot contain more than one point, so we have a
contradiction as both li and lj are on LS.
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H Proof of Lemma 4, part of Theorem 6
Lemma 4. A closed trajectory   cannot intersect the discontinuity line L on exactly two points
that are on opposite sides of (  ; I
).
Proof. Call A = (SA; I
) the point in   \ L with SA <  , and call B = (SB ; I) the one with
SB >

 . Let   be parameterized by (t) = (x(t); y(t)); t 2 [0; T ]; also (0) = (T ). Function
(t) is a solution of the dierential inclusion, that is, _(t) = ( _x(t); _y(t)) 2 F ((t)); t 2 [0; T ].
Let tA; tB 2 [0; T ] be such that A = (tA) and B = (tB). Let A; B 2 [0; 1] be such that
_x(tA) =  xy   x+ A(1  y) and _x(tB) =  xy   x+ B(1  y).
Dene P (x; y) and Q(x; y); (x; y) 2 D n fy; y > 0g as follows:
P (x; y) =  1
y
_y =  1
y
(xy   y) =    x
Q(x; y) =
1
y
_x =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
y ( xy + (1  x  y)); y < I
1
y ( xy   x+ A(1  y)); x   ; y = I
1
y ( xy   x+ B(1  y)); x >  ; y = I
1
y ( xy   x); y > I
We compute
H
 
Pdx+Qdy in two ways.
For the rst computation, we use the parametrization (t) = (x(t); y(t)) of  , so dx = _xdt and
dy = _ydt. The result is zero:I
 
Pdx+Qdy =
Z T
0
 1
y
_y _xdt+
1
y
_x _ydt = 0: (12)
For the second computation, we split Q(x; y) into two functions, one continuous Qc(x; y) and
one discontinuous Qd(x; y), so that Q(x; y) = Qc(x; y) +Qd(x; y).
Qc(x; y) =
1
y
( xy   x)
Qd(x; y) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
y(1  y); y < I
1
yA(1  y); x   ; y = I
1
yB(1  y); x >  ; y = I
0; y > I
So now the original integral can be split into two:
H
 
Pdx + Qdy =
H
 
Pdx + (Qc + Qd)dy =H
 
Pdx+Qcdy +
H
 
Qddy. We use Green's theorem to compute the rst integral.I
 
Pdx+Qcdy =
ZZ
 
@Qc
@x
  @P
@y
dxdy =
ZZ
 
    
y
dxdy < 0: (13)
To compute the second integral
H
 
Qddy, we dene function
Qextd (x; y) =
1
y
(1  y); (x; y) 2 D n fy; y > 0g
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and curves  1 and  2. Curve  1 is   restricted to y  I, with direction from A to B. Curve  2 is
the line segment of L joining B and A, with direction from B to A.
Observe that I
 
Qddy =
I
 1[ 2
Qextd dy =
ZZ
 1[ 2
@Qextd
@x
dxdy = 0; (14)
where the rst equality follows from Qd  Qextd on  1 and dy = 0 on  2, whereas the last equality
follows from Green's theorem, because Qextd is continuously dierentiable.
The result of (12) contradicts the results of (13) and (14). So, the trajectory   with the assumed
properties cannot exist.
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